3 deadly traps coded in the vaccine pass - Counterpoints

3 deadly traps coded in the vaccine pass - Counterpoints

Published on January 28, 2022-A+

The technical choices made when designing the health pass do not protect the citizen against state abuse. On the contrary, they facilitate three types of abuse, two of which are already exploited.

Facilitating arbitrary decisions

The state has changed the health pass to a vaccination pass.

In practice, there is technically no change of pass. The health pass does not contain any pass, it must in fact rather be baptized health certificate because it only contains your health course.

It does not bear the mention valid or invalid but: "negative antigen test of January 4, 2022 at 10:45 a.m." or even "second Pfizer vaccine dose injected on December 6, 2021 at 6:30 p.m.".

All the information is readable on the QR Code, just scan it. We have already mentioned its content in a previous article. I have also provided a scanner to read its content at greenpass.codable.tv.

The pass simply certifies the wearer's health course. As long as the latter does not modify it, the QRCode remains unchanged.

Thus, the valid or invalid is mentioned on the government application TousAntiCovidVerif. It is the current algorithm that applies valid or invalide government rules.

These rules can therefore be changed very quickly, just update the application, without changing any pass.

3 deadly traps coded in the vaccine pass - Counterpoints

When switching from the health pass to the vaccination pass, the new rules of the application will now refuse all health passes from a test.

When the state wants to make the third dose mandatory, again it will be enough to update the application. And all second dose health passes will become invalid without the need to change any QRCode.

This device is therefore perfectly adapted to the tyranny of the government, to its frequent changes of decisions, to the arbitrary rules.

The vaccination pass or the third dose show that this threat is being exploited.

Facilitating mass surveillance

Leaving health data freely available for anyone to process is already an offense condemned by the GDPR. But the government seems to have nothing to do with the rule of law.

Much worse for our privacy, the scan of our QR Code goes into the government application. From there, anything can happen. As already explained in a previous post, the scan result can be uploaded to a central server at any time, by a simple update.

Once again this threat shows the tip of its nose. In Germany, restaurateurs keep scans on the Luca application to be able to recall contact cases.

This information was collected by the police who wanted to know who had frequented a restaurant in order to solve an investigation.

The possibility of using the QR Code as a surveillance weapon is therefore proven. Admittedly, the app was not state-run and the intentions of the police seemed laudable. However, we can see that a foot has been put in the door of our private lives. However, these days, the doors do not close once the state foot is put through.

Facilitate the extension of the pass to other diseases

This is what emerges from the data structure of the pass. It can record other illnesses. In fact, when analyzing the code, the medical pathway is linked to the v/tg field, which designates a target disease. For the moment, there is only one 840539006 for covid, but nothing prohibits adding others. The health pass is designed to be multi-disease.

This threat has yet to be exploited…yet.

Conclusion

The health pass is therefore above all a health certificate. No need to change it to a vaccine pass, the QRCodes remain unchanged, you just need to update a few lines of code in the government application.

The health pass shows its true face. It does nothing to fight the epidemic. He is there only to better spy on us, better control us. It is designed for the future, to be able to change the rules every day if necessary, designed to repatriate data easily, designed for all future epidemics.

Article available in podcast here.